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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyse the causes and impact of the significant mean price discounts (25% for 
financial and 29% for non-financial firms) in rights issues in the UK using a sample of 
268 observations for the period of 1994 to 2012.  We observe that for non-financial 
companies the issue terms announcement returns are negatively affected by the discount 
size, while firm size, growth prospects and good previous stock performance have a 
positive impact.  We also investigate which factors seem to influence managers to 
engage in deeper discounts when these are so disliked by investors. Evidence is 
provided that firms with more leverage, larger bid-ask spreads or suffering losses tend 
to choose deeper discounts. We conclude that managers balance the expected negative 
reaction of the market to a price discount with the risks of a costly issue failure, with 
these being higher when the firm experiences losses, has a higher volatility and also 
when the stock market climate is more adverse. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
On 23 September 2014, Mothercare’s shareholders were told that they would be able to buy, 
in a £100 million rights issue, 9 new shares for each 10 shares already owned with a discount 
of 34 percent to preannouncement stock price. The shares ended up -2% lower on that day.  
In contrast, in September 2009, two large UK housebuilders, Barratt Developments and 
Redrow, simultaneously launched two rights issues to raise a total of almost £850m in equity. 
In both cases the firms set up subscription terms at a heavier discount from closing prices 
before the announcement (63% and 55%, respectively). Commenting on this issue, an analyst 
observed that “the size of the discounts to the market price shows how much these companies 
wanted the money” (Flanagan, 2009). These announcements were followed by quite more 
significant falls in share prices than in the case or Mothercare (three-day drops of -8% and -
9%, respectively) 
Analysing RPC Group’ s announced discounted rights issues, the Financial Times Online (29 
January, 2016) observed that  “shareholders generally don’t like the way rights issues force 
them either to stump up cash or see their existing holding diluted.” In accordance with this, as 
Societé Générale, a French financial institution, announced in February 2008 a £4.1 billion 
(€5.5 billion) rights issue, with a discount priced on the new shares of around 39%, an analyst 
noted that, “as they can't afford this operation to go wrong, they've decided to hit very low” 
(Times Online, February 12, 2008). As the Office of Fair Trading (2011, p. 25) points out, 
“company executives are also keen to avoid the perception by the stock market of financial 
weakness and a lack of shareholder support that non-underwritten deeply discounted issues 
are sometimes associated with”. 
Up until the 90s, rights issues were “the norm in the UK and the rest of Europe” (Armitage, 
1998, p. 31).While rights issues have seen their importance gradually fall in the UK since the 
90s, there were still about 20 rights issues per year in the first decade of the 21
st
 century 
(Armitage, 2007) and these are still one of the most common form of seasoned equity issues 
after open offers (Armitage, 2007). Even though in theory price discounts in rights issues 
should not matter (Armitage, 1998
1
), the examples above suggest that the market seems to 
view the existence of price discounts in rights offers as a significant negative signal about the 
                                                 
1
 “Assuming no difference in market response and transaction costs between different levels of discount, the 
wealth of shareholders is unaffected by the depth of discount or by whether or not they sell their rights” 
(Armitage, 1998, p. 50). 
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success of the rights issues and/or the future financial performance of the issuing firm. In this 
paper we seek to empirically address this topic, by first analysing whether it is in fact true 
that, unlike standard theory, and after controlling for other factors, the definition of the 
selling price for new shares issued to existing shareholders through a rights offering can be a 
value relevant decision. We also investigate whether there are any differences in this regard 
between financial and non-financial firms.  
Our major concern in this paper, however, is to examine why, if price discounts in fact 
command a significant negative impact on share prices, do managers still engage in 
significant price cuttings. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that seeks to identify the 
key factors that have an influence on the decision to set up a specific price discount. We also 
provide an analysis that splits firms between financial and non-financial to look for potential 
differences in the way these factors impact on the discount decision. Given the distinctive 
higher importance, due to its specific regulatory environment, of meeting equity capital ratios 
in the financial sector in comparison with other industries, we anticipate that meeting capital 
requirements generate particular benefits to financial companies that can reduce other 
potentially adverse signals coming from deep discounts in rights issues. 
Our results show a number of interesting conclusions. First, in spite of the significant 
negative market reaction that we observe to the announcement of price discounts, there are 
indeed relevant differences between financial and non-financial firms. Specifically, we do not 
observe for the latter the same statistically significant impact of prices discounts on the 
announcement returns as we do for non-financial companies. Second, we document evidence 
consistent with the idea that managers balance the expected negative reaction of the market to 
a price discount with the risks and costs of an issue failure, with these being potentially 
higher when the firm experiences losses, has higher volatility and also when the stock market 
climate is more adverse. Our findings also again reveal some differences between financial 
and non-financial firms. For the former we provide evidence that firms with more leverage, 
larger bid-ask spreads or suffering losses tend to choose deeper discounts. In the case of 
financial institutions, however, although bid-ask spreads and losses also have a similar 
impact, leverage does not have a statistically significant influence on price discounts.  
The remainder of paper is structured as follows. First we provide a literature review and 
present our major research hypothesis. Section 3 then proceeds to describe the sample and the 
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methodology used. The following section presents the empirical results and in section 5 we 
provide the main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and research questions 
In a rights issue, shareholders of listed companies that decide to issue new equity capital are 
given an instrument (the “rights”) that entitles them to exercise a free option to acquire new 
shares at a predefined price, typically below the preannouncement stock price. In contrast, in 
an open offer, currently the most used seasoned equity issue form in the UK, shares issued 
are privately placed before being offered pro-rata to existing shareholders. Thus, in sharp 
contrast to rights issues, shareholders cannot sell their entitlements in an open offer 
(Armitage, 2007). Contrary to other seasoned equity issues, Espenlaub et al (2009) show that 
the market reaction to open offers is a positive one. 
In theory, as long as the price at which the new shares are sold is lower than the stock price 
prior to the equity issue, the pricing of the new shares should be irrelevant
2
. In fact, 
shareholders can either (i) exercise their rights and buy the new shares, enjoying a positive 
difference between the ex-rights stock price and one at which they bought the new shares, or 
simply  (ii) cash in the value of their rights by selling these in the open market. Assuming 
market efficiency, in the first case their apparent gain should be matched by a corresponding 
drop in the price of the old shares upon the exercise of the rights. In the second case, the 
amount received from the sale of the rights should also be equal to the capital loss in the old 
shares
3
. Consistent with this reasoning, standard finance textbooks (see for example, 
Brigham, 2006 ) typically mention that any discount made in relation to the current stock 
price should be perfectly matched by an increase in the value of the rights that each 
shareholder will receive, leaving its total wealth unchanged. 
However, it is a well-established fact that the announcement of rights issues in the UK is 
generally seen as bad news by investors in the stock market (see for example Armitage, 1998, 
Burton et al., 2000, and Slovin et al., 2000). Similar results have also been found for other 
                                                 
2
 If the price was set above the current stock price, nobody would be willing to acquire neither the new shares 
nor the corresponding rights. 
3
 One should note that the ex-rights price should be equal to the market capitalisation of the firm’s shares after 
the announcement plus the cash proceeds of the new issue divided by the total number of shares after the 
conclusion of the issue. 
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countries (see for example Singh, 1997 for the US, Marsden, 2000 in New Zealand, Kabir 
and Roosenboom, 2003 for the Netherlands or Ginglinger et al, 2013 for France). 
In addition to this evidence, and as the examples in the prior section show, it is a common 
perception among finance practitioners that heavily discounted new shares issued in rights 
offerings can be a particularly negative signal for the value of the company.  
A possible reason for the practitioners’ apparent nervousness when the selling price is set at a 
low level is that the company’s attitude may reflect its view that, if no sufficient discount is 
made, there is a higher likelihood that the rights-on price might fall to a level too close to the 
price of the new shares, potentially jeopardizing the success of the issue. As such, investors 
may feel that managers engage in deep discounts when they believe that current share prices 
are overvalued (Armitage, 1998) and thus react accordingly in the market when such issue 
terms are announced. Managers in practice have to strike a balance between the costs of a bad 
signal given to the market arising from a price which was set at low levels with the benefits 
of that discount. One may reason that if no discount was made, a huge risk could occur that 
the investors do not take up the shares in the face of any potential market-wide movements 
that could negatively affect the current stock price. 
Also, market participants frequently view the existence of deep discount in rights offerings 
“as a coercive way for a company to raise money”4, given that such a deep discount makes it 
prohibitively expensive not to exercise the right (Bohren et al, 2007).  
Such concern about a heavy discount on the price of the new shares, if any, should matter 
however much more in the case of open offers than in rights issues. In an open offer, if a 
shareholder does not have the financial means to acquire the new shares, he/she will either 
suffer a direct loss (if no new shares are bought) or at the very least engage in additional costs 
(and financial risks) by obtaining cash through loans or other sources to finance the 
acquisition of the new securities. In contrast, if a shareholder receives tradable rights he/she 
will avoid this altogether as long as there is a sufficiently liquid market to sell those rights. 
Therefore, in a rights issue one would not anticipate that the size of discounts should matter 
unlike the case for open offers where the only alternative to avoid losses is to invest in more 
shares, which for some may not be either feasible or possible at very low cost. Thus in rights 
issues, and in remarkable contrast to open offers, only irrational investors would not be able 
                                                 
4
 Posted in www.fool.com, 12.07.2007. 
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to counterbalance the  losses arising from the drop in share prices upon the completion of the 
share issue. As Armitage (2007, p. 1346) points out, “because the entitlements cannot be 
sold, a discount means that wealth is transferred to the placees from the non-subscribing 
shareholders “. We therefore focus in this research our attention only on rights issues, where, 
unlike open offers, and apart from the signalling issues already mentioned above, in theory 
discounts should not matter for rational investors
5
. 
Balachandran et al (2009) analyse the market impact of rights offerings terms announcements 
in Australia and find that the market reaction to rights issues is particularly negative in issues 
characterised by high price discounts. The authors acknowledge that managers tend to signal 
the quality of their firm by the choice of rights issues method and argue that lower-quality 
firms tend to use only partial standby agreements by underwriters and large subscription price 
discounts, whereas higher quality ones tend to use full standby rights issues agreements by 
underwriters with relatively low price discounts. As the authors also observe, an additional 
factor that is relevant for the potential market reaction to the announcement of a rights offering 
is whether the issue is insured by underwriters or not. In other words, if the risk of issue failure 
is minimized because underwriters provided a standby agreement to take up any non-
subscribed shares, then one could anticipate that the perception of firm quality by the market 
will be more positive than that of an uninsured issue, and so a large price discount in such case 
would not have such potential negative impact. 
In the UK, although non-pre-emptive equity issues are possible, companies raise most of their 
new equity capital under pre-emptive conditions whereby shares are offered to existing 
shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings. Within pre-emptive equity raising, 
companies mostly use underwritten rights issues (Marsh, 1980, Levis, 1995, Capstaff and 
Fletcher, 2011). Although possible in theory, there are in practice very few instances of non-
underwritten new equity issues (Office of Fair Trading, 2011). 
To explain the apparent puzzle where managers choose price discounts that investors dislike, 
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) derive a model for equity issue type choice model where, due to 
asymmetric information, high quality firms signal their value by choosing rights issues with 
                                                 
5
 A possible exception, however, which has been pointed out by Armitage (2007) is that it may be costly to sell 
large blocks of rights. However, even with this potential cost, price discounts in rights issues are still arguably 
much less costly or important than those occurring in open offers where shareholders receive only non-tradable 
rights, therefore exposing themselves to potentially large losses. In 1999 document, the UK Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, even though expressing some concerns about the liquidity of the market for rights 
concluded in favour of the inexistence of substantial costs in the sale of rights in the market, with some 
exception for very illiquid shares. 
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low discounts and standby underwriting agreements. Consistent with that model, Slovin et al 
(2000) report results for the period 1986-94 in the UK where price discounts have a negative 
impact on firm value. However, prior to 1986 (when major deregulation changes in the Stock 
Exchange regulations occurred), they observed no negative impact of the subscription price 
discount on share prices.  
There is a large US-based literature on Secondary Equity Offerings (SEOs) that has in 
analysed, among many other aspects, the impact of price discounts. Some of the factors that 
have been observed to influence the price discounts of the new shares are the pre-issue return 
volatility of the issuing firm, the relative size of the offer (Corwin, 2003). Price discounts in 
these SEOs are typically in the region of 2% (Corwin, 2003). The existing literature presents 
a number of theoretical arguments to explain this apparent underpricing of SEOs that include 
uncertainty and asymmetrical information (ex. Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986), price 
pressure (Scholes, 1972), manipulative trading (Gerard and Nanda, 1993), transaction cost 
savings (Loderer et al, 1991) and underwriting practices (Lee et al, 1996). However, in the 
typical SEOs that take place in the US, shares are not offered to existing shareholders but to 
the general public. As such, practicing discounts in the pricing of new shares creates a direct 
cost to existing shareholders, in contrast with rights issues (and, to a lesser extent, open offers 
in the UK). In general terms SEO pricing in the US is thought to results from the interaction 
between the demand and supply curves for new shares (where the demand is driven mostly 
by outside investors) and any factors than can influence the price elasticity associated to these 
curves (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Huang, and Zhang, 2011). We therefore regard the question of 
price setting in SEOs in the US as being essentially distinct from that of equity issues carried 
out through rights offerings. This is also the reason that we do not take into account in our 
analysis private placements, in addition to the already excluded open offers. 
Given most likely the fact that in the US rights issues are very rare, existing empirical 
literature in this area is scarce and, above all, no field research has yet examined to our 
knowledge the specific factors that influence managers to choose a heavily discounted price 
for the new securities issued through rights offering in spite of the potential adverse effects 
on a firm’s stock price.   
In this paper we look at evidence from the UK, where, unlike in the US, pro-rata issuance of 
new shares to existing shareholders is the norm, rather than the exception, for seasoned equity 
issues and where rights issues in particular have an importance. We test not only whether the 
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market reacts more negatively to the announcement of a rights issue when the selling price is 
set at a large discount from current stock prices, but also analyse the factors that influence a 
managerial decision to set up a particular discount.  Prior research is not unambiguous as for 
example Slovin et al (2000) in the UK found that for 1986-94 the price discount has a 
negative impact on announcement returns, consistent with investors viewing it as a negative 
signal of firm value, but the same was not observed in their study for the period before 1986. 
Armitage (2002), however, observes a negative impact of discounts on the market reaction to 
the terms of the rights offering. 
We extend the existing research in a number of ways. Similarly to extant literature, we look 
at more recent evidence (1994-2012) but also test a number of different variables that can 
influence the market reaction to price discounts can be more or less severe contingent on the 
firm’s characteristics. Second, and more importantly, we examine the factors that have a 
potential influence on the manager’s decision to set up a particular level of price discount to 
the new shares and whether these are different between financial and non-financial firms. 
We anticipate that the managerial decision to set up a larger price discount is likely to be 
influenced by the level of debt in a company or the existence of losses. In fact, in a more 
leveraged and/or loss-making company the costs of an unsuccessful rights offering may be 
especially high as this can increase the likelihood of corporate failure (Altman, 1968). In this 
context a heavily discounted offer may increase the success of the rights issue.  
In the case of financial firms, their regulatory environment imposes very strict rules regarding 
the existence of a minimum level of equity capital. Companies failing to comply with this 
requirement face a severe risk of a regulatory intervention (eg, a bailout) if not straight 
liquidation or an acquisition by third party as a last resort way for avoiding bankruptcy. 
Therefore, for these institutions, ensuring the success of an equity issue can be far more 
important than to non-financial firms. As Bohren et al (1997) assert, because of their capital 
requirements, equity issues in banks (and insurance companies) have different characteristics 
from those of non-financial firms (and have more predictable equity issues than these) and 
therefore should not be analysed jointly. Also Dahl and Shrives (1990) show that regulatory 
minimum capital requirements are a direct cause for equity issues in banks, thus suggesting 
that the risk of an issue failure can be far more severe in this industry than in the non-
financial sector. Given this different regulatory environment and the fact that the debt levels 
(one of our determinants of price discounts) of financial firms are usually much higher than 
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non-financial ones, we provide in our research separate analyses for these two types of 
companies. For financial firms, one can argue that price discounts could be on one hand 
higher than for non-financial firms due to the potentially more dire consequences of equity 
issue failures. However, if the perceived benefits of an equity issue are usually more clear in 
financial companies (they are required by their regulatory environment) then it could be that 
shareholders may not need a very high discount to be enticed to subscribe the new shares. 
Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical issue. A similar reasoning applies to the market 
reaction to the announcement of the terms of an equity issue in the case of financial 
institutions.  Higher price discounts in financial firm rights issues may be either seen 
unfavourably by the market but also could be more welcomed than in non-financial firms if it 
reassures shareholders that the risk of an equity issue failure (and of a subsequent regulatory 
intervention, bailout or last resort acquisition by an external party) is minimized.   
However, there are also other potentially important factors that managers may take into 
consideration. As suggested above, firms whose stock price is more volatile may be more at 
risk of a downward share price movement that could endanger the success of a rights offering 
if no sufficiently high discount is made on the new shares. Since shares with larger bid-ask 
spreads are usually perceived as having greater volatility or being less liquid (Copeland and 
Galai, 1983), we would expect that bid-ask spread should have a positive impact on the size 
of the price discount of the new shares. Similarly, if the offer is made at a time of a bear 
market, managers may sense also a higher risk that, due to market-wide movements, the share 
price might drop below the price set up for the new shares, in which case the rights issues 
would become unattractive to investors. Consistent with this assertion, Levis (1995) suggests 
that managers may time the announcement of a seasoned equity offering for after a period of 
significant rises in stock prices. 
Whether the above factors are indeed important in practice for managers when setting up the 
terms of a rights offering is then mostly an empirical issue which we seek to address in this 
paper.  
In addition to determining the cause of discounts, we also formally analyse the hypothesis 
that, due to an unfavourable signal conveyed by a large price discount, there will be a 
negative reaction from investors to the announcement of the rights issues price terms. 
However, when these share issues take place in companies perceived by investors as more 
profitable, with better growth opportunities, or in instances where the recent stock 
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performance of the company has been good, such reaction is likely to be more positive (see 
Eckbo and Masulis, 1995, for a survey of the valuation effects of SEO announcements). 
Finally, we expect that in firms whose ownership is more concentrated, the reaction to the 
announcement of the terms of the share issue may be more negative given the potential for 
minority shareholders wealth appropriation by majority owners (La Porta et al, 2000). 
 
 
3. Sample, methodology and summary statistics 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
Data collection starts by retrieving a list of rights issues deals, their details and identifiers 
from Thomson OneBanker deals module. Only deals for stocks traded at the London Stock 
Exchange and traded in British pounds are considered. Each deal is then verified using the 
London Share Price Database and Datastream capital changes module information and those 
that are not confirmed in both these databases are excluded from the analysis. Given that 
Thomson OneBanker does not provide the exchange rate information for each deal, we use 
the information provided by the Datastream capital changes module. Finally, only firms that 
have information in both Datastream for daily market data and Worldscope for accounting 
data are included in the final sample. After this process, the final sample is comprised by268 
rights issues deals that occurred during the period of 1994-122012, with 32232 and 636 deals 
for non-financial and financial firms, respectively. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Pre-announcement causes for discount and market reaction 
 
The analysis as discussed previously is divided in two stages. In a first step (thereafter pre-
announcement) we evaluate the firm’s and market conditions that determine the price 
discount. In a second stage (in what we term the post-announcement period) we measure the 
market reaction to the rights issues announcement by calculating the Abnormal 
Announcement Returns (AAR) by cumulating the difference between daily returns (R) and 
expected market returns (ER) for the period of -2 to 2 relative to the announcement day, 
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following the approach implemented by Iqbal (2008). This is done with a set of variables 
which includes, besides others, the price discount offered in the right issue
10
. 
 
3.2.2. Pre- announcement causes for price discounts 
 
We apply both multiple OLS cross-section and ordered probit regressions in our analysis. 
This allows determining the effect of firm’s characteristics and market conditions on the price 
discount but also, and more importantly, to provide information regarding the probability of 
the price discount range. The models are defined as follows: 
 
                                                                              (1) 
and, 
              {
                      
                         
                      
   (2) 
 
where     and     are the cut-off points
11
. PRICE DISCOUNT is the discount relative to the 
last available stock price and defined as one minus the issue price divided by the last 
available price. A higher price discount consistent with investors viewing it as a negative 
signal of firm value should impact negatively post-announcement returns.  
LEVERAGE is calculated as total debt to total assets ratio. As discussed in section 2, one 
expects higher leveraged firms will be under more pressure to offer larger price discounts to 
ensure the success of the share offering. Under another perspective, more leveraged firms 
will usually present higher volatility of stock returns (Christie, 1982) and therefore a greater 
likelihood of an adverse movement in stock prices that can endanger the success of the share 
issue, urging firms to set up a greater price discount in the new shares. Therefore, a positive 
relationship between firm’s debt levels and the price discount is anticipated. BID_ASK is the 
bid-ask price before the announcement of the rights offer terms and is defined as the Ask 
price minus Bid price divided by the midpoint of the ask and bid prices averaged over the 
previous year. As previously discussed and suggested by Copeland and Galai (1983), we take 
the bid-ask spread as a proxy for the riskiness or volatility of the share price and expect the 
price discount to be greater for firms with relatively large bid-ask spreads due, once again, to 
                                                 
10
 Heckman correction test confirms that there is no selection bias. The explanatory variables used for the price 
discount are not relevant for the CAR regression. 
11
 Price discounts are divided by terciles. 
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the greater risk that the stock price will fall below the subscription price thus endangering the 
success of the offering. LOSS is a binary variable equal to one if last year’s return on assets is 
negative and zero otherwise. We expect that firms with previous year negative return on 
assets will be under greater financial pressure due to the danger of bankruptcy (Altman, 
1968) and will thus tend to offer higher price discounts to minimize the risk of an equity issue 
failure. Finally, M_SENTIMENT represents last year’s market sentiment and is defined as a 
binary variable equal to one if last year’s market return (previous to the right issue 
announcement) is positive and zero otherwise. Generally consistent with Levis (1995) finding 
that managers schedule SEOs after observing a period of rising stock prices, we anticipate 
that a “good” market sentiment will induce firms to practice a lower price discount as these 
perceive a lower risk of a market downfall, therefore it is expected a negative relation 
between market sentiment and price discount. Table 1 summarizes the variables calculation 
and expected relationship with price discounts. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2.3. Market reaction to price discounts 
 
We also analyse the post-announcement effect on the cumulative abnormal returns (thereafter 
CAR) around the announcement of the right issues terms. The abnormal announcement 
returns is calculated as follows: 
 
   i  t ∑ ( i  t-  i  t)
2
t -2
     (3) 
 
where i and t represents firm and number of trading days before and after the announcement 
day, respectively. Calculation of expected returns is based on the market model which is 
estimated for the period -260 to -20 days before the announcement date, using the FTSE All 
Shares index return as a proxy for market returns. 
 
The model is described as follows: 
 
                                                                  
                                             (4) 
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where CAR_RIGHTS is the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window (-2 to 2) 
observed in the market around the announcement date of the rights issues offer. PRICE 
DISCOUNT is the discount relative to the last available stock price and defined as one minus 
the issue price divided by the last available price. It is expected a negative relationship with 
the observed cumulative abnormal returns due to the negative information to the market 
provided by a large price discount. SIZE is calculated as the natural logarithm of firm market 
value at the day prior to the announcement. Larger firms are more visible to the market due 
for example by more frequently raising capital. Therefore a favourable (or less negative) 
response from the market can be expected following rights issues offerings and thus a 
positive relation between firm size and cumulative abnormal returns is anticipated. ROA is 
defined as net income over total assets. It is likely that for more profitable firms the market 
reaction to equity issues will be more favourable, thus suggesting a positive sign for this 
variable. TOBIN’s Q is a proxy for future growth opportunities and is defined as the ratio 
between the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt over the book value 
of equity and debt. For firms with better growth opportunities, it is expected that the market 
will react more positively to the announcement of share issues (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). 
C_HELD_SHARES represents the percentage of shares held by majority shareholders. For 
more concentrated firms, with the possibility of conflicts of interest between minority and 
majority shareholders (La Porta et al, 2000), investors may react more negatively to share 
issues where the control is maintained by a small group of shareholders. However, a large 
free float may also be associated to potential manager-shareholder conflicts (Maug, 1998), in 
which case a large free float could be associated with a more negative reaction by the market 
to the announcement of the rights offer terms. We thus expect an ambiguous sign for this 
variable. Finally, F_SENTIMENT represents the investor sentiment to the announcement of 
share issues and is proxied by a binary variable equal to one if the firm’s cumulative market 
return in the 90 days prior to the announcement is positive and zero otherwise. We expect 
that a positive sentiment will positively impact the cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement data. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the variables definition and expected relationship with the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement of right issues terms. 
 
[Please insert Table 2 here]  
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3.3 Summary Statistics 
 
In table 3 (panels A and B) summary statistics for both non-financial and financial firms for 
the variables used for the pre and post-announcement empirical analysis are presented. In 
panel A (pre-announcement) for non-financial firms the average price discount for the 232 
deals is 29.1 percent showing clear evidence of the large price discounts typically found in 
right issues announcements. On average debt accounts for 25.9 percent of firm’s total assets 
and close to 40 percent of companies had a negative return on assets prior to the 
announcement with 60 percent of the cases coinciding with a positive market sentiment. In 
the analysis of the market reaction to discount sizes (in what we term the post-announcement 
period), the cumulative abnormal returns are negative (2.8 percent) on average. Around only 
30 percent of the firm’s shares are held by majority shareholders, showing a substantial 
ownership dispersion. In 60 percent of the cases the firm’s cumulative return in prior 90 days 
to the announcement is positive.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 panels A and B here] 
 
In panel B summary statistics for financial firms are presented to the 36 deals observed 
during the period 1994 to 2012. In general, the results do not differ substantially from non-
financial firms counterparts. However, we can highlight the average lower price discount for 
financial firms, with a lower median and close to half of the value for the first quartile of 
deals (6.1 and 10.9 percent for financial and non-financial firms, respectively). Financial 
firms are more leveraged, have lower bid-ask spread (less volatile/higher liquidity), are larger 
than non-financial firms and their ownership is almost as concentrated as those. Therefore, 
due to the highlighted differences between the two sub-samples it will be interesting to 
perform independent regressions to assess whether the variables used in this paper will 
impact differently on price discounts and cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
Table 4 (panels A and B) presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrixes
12
 for non-
financial and financial firms (p-values in parenthesis). Both sub-samples show that larger 
firms are more profitable, less volatile (lower bid-ask spread) and they are less likely to report 
losses. Also more profitable firms have lower bid-ask spread and firms with higher levels of 
                                                 
12
 Values for the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrixes are presented below and above the diagonal, 
respectively. 
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debt are associated with better growth opportunities. Moreover larger financial firms have 
lower debt levels and more concentrated firms have higher levels of debt. For non-financial 
firms larger companies are less concentrated and more concentrated firms have a wider bid-
ask spread, situations not statistical significant for financial firms. Finally firm ownership 
concentration is positively related with growth opportunities for financial firms and 
negatively for non-financial firms. 
 
[Please insert Table 4 panels A and B here] 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Determinants of Price Discounts 
 
Table 5 reports the cross-section regression estimates of price discounts for both non-
financial and financial firms’ deals according to the basic test equation (1) presented in 
section 3. Four different regressions are estimated with the use of different sets of variables. 
The first column named “model 1” presents the results for the variable Leverage. For the 
other columns/models we add one by one the additional variables reported in the previous 
section, which were argued to be potential determinants of the price discount level prior to 
announcement: Bid-Ask, Loss and M_Sentiment.  
 
Overall, the coefficients are statistically significant and no differences were found in the 
predicted signs presented previously in table 1, for non-financials and financials firms, 
besides the variable Leverage. Indeed, the strong effect of Leverage on price discount for 
non-financial firms is not observed for financial firms
13
. For non-financial firms higher levels 
of debt, larger bid-ask spreads and recent losses increase the price discount for the new 
shares, whereas for financial firms only bid-ask spreads and reported losses have a similar 
statistical significance with the expected sign
14
.  
 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
13
 The coefficient for financial firms is negative, however not statistical significant. 
14
 In a separate analysis, we studied whether the relative magnitude of the issue would be also a relevant 
variable in the regression. Unreported results (tables available upon request) show that the coefficients of the 
main variables maintain their signs and significance. However, missing observations in our database reduced in 
some magnitude the number of observations, especially in the case of financial companies, so this variable was 
not included in the main analysis. 
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Table 6 (panels A and B) shows the results for the ordered probit model presented in section 
4, equation 2. The price discount is divided by terciles for both non-financials and financials 
sub-samples. For non-financial firms the cut-off for the first and third terciles is 12.3 and 
24.38 percent, respectively whereas for financial firms the values are 7.37 and 20.93 percent. 
The use of an ordered probit model in our analysis allows estimating the probability to apply 
a low, medium or large price discount due to changes in explanatory variables.  
 
[Please insert Table 6 panels A and B here] 
 
The results are quite interesting and bring insights in terms of the role of Leverage in price 
discounts, differentiating among non-financial and financial firms. In fact, each one percent 
rises in leverage for non-financial firms increases the probability of a larger price discount 
(i.e., a discount above 24.38 percent) by 0.332 percentage points and decrease the probability 
of lower price discount by 0.336 percentage points. Surprisingly, different results are 
obtained for financial firms where a one percent increase in Leverage decreases the 
probability of a larger price discount (i.e., a discount above 20.93 percent) by 0.445 
percentage points and decrease the probability of lower price discount by 0.466 percentage 
points
15
. We interpret this difference between financial and non-financial firms as being 
consistent with the idea that, all else constant, the benefits of equity capital for banks with 
low equity ratios are perceived by investors as strong enough to incentive these to take up the 
new shares even with relatively low discounts. This is probably because equity issues directly 
impact on the ability of financial firms to expand their lending activities. For the remaining 
variables (Bid-ask, Loss and M_Sentiment), losses reported in the last year increase the 
probability of larger discounts (third tercile), while bid-ask spread is not significant in 
explaining differences in the price discounts levels. In addition, market sentiment is relevant 
for financial institutions but not for non-financial counterparts. A “good” market sentiment 
increases the probability for financial firms of practice larger price discounts by 0.252 
percentage points.   
                                                 
15
 The role of leverage in price discount was highlighted already in the OLS regressions where no evidence was 
found for financial firms regarding higher levels of leverage and higher price discounts. Due to the few deals for 
financial firms the use of the ordered probit model brings additional evidence insights of the role of leverage in 
price discounts levels. 
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4.2 Post-announcement market reaction to price discounts 
 
In table 7 (panels A and B) we provide the results for the cumulative abnormal returns around 
the announcement of the right issues terms. In this table six different regressions are 
estimated with the use of different sets of variables. The first column named “model 1” 
presents the results for the variable Price Discount our main explanatory variable. For the 
other columns/models we add one by one the control variables reported in the previous 
section. For non-financial firms the price discount has a negative statistical significant effect 
on the cumulative abnormal returns for all the different model specifications. Indeed, all else 
constant, a 1 percent increase in the price discount will negatively affect CARs by 5.3 percent. 
These results are in line with those reported by Burton et al. (2000), Slovin et al. (2000) and 
Armitage (2002) showing evidence that the announcement of right issues in the UK is seen as 
bad news by investors in the stock market and that part of this is caused by the price discount. 
This is consistent with the common perception among finance practitioners that this is a 
negative signal for the value of the company. However, our data does not warrant a similar 
conclusion in the case of financial firms as the price discount has only at best marginal 
significance in models used. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 panels A and B here] 
 
We also find positive statistical evidence of SIZE, TOBIN’s Q and F_SENTIMENT in 
explaining the CARs for non-financial firms. The results show that in larger firms the 
announcement of rights issues commands a more favourable impact on CARs. Additionally, 
an increase in future growth opportunities and positive market returns 90 days prior to the 
announcement also affects positively cumulative abnormal returns. For the Financial Firms 
sub-sample, the variables ROA and F_SENTIMENT are the most relevant explanatory 
variables for CARs, being not just statistical significant but also with the predicted signs. 
Indeed, previous firm’s performance addressed both in accounting and market terms have per 
se a positive impact in the way investors perceive the announcement of right issues. In 
summary, the results report clear evidence of the importance of price discount as a 
determinant of CAR for both non-financial and financial firms, firm-characteristics better 
explain CAR for non-financial firms and firm’s prior market return is a statistically significant 
variable for both sub-samples. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
We document that price discounts in right issues for non- financial and financial firms are 
determined by a set of firm-characteristics and market sentiment (tables 5 and 6). We bring 
evidence that price discounts are not arbitrarily determined by firm managers. Indeed, our 
results shows that when determining price discounts managers take in consideration the 
firm’s level of debt, the stock price volatility, the firm’s recent financial performance, and the 
market conditions. Examining in detail how firm- characteristics affect price discounts we 
find that leverage impacts differently on non-financial and financial firms. In fact larger debt 
ratios prior to the right issues announcement for non-financial firms increase the probability 
of larger price discounts whereas this is not observed for the financial counterparts. We 
interpret this difference as consistent with the idea that the benefits of equity capital for 
financial institutions with low equity ratios are perceived by investors as strong enough to 
incentive these to take up the new shares even with relatively low discounts. 
 
Following the discussion about price discounts and cumulative abnormal returns, non-
financial firms have lower CAR as the price discounts increases, but for financial companies 
such result is not statistically significant. We confirm the results from Burton et al. (2000), 
Slovin et al. (2000) and Armitage (2002) showing clear evidence that the announcement of 
right issues in the UK is seen as bad news by investors, and our evidence also supports the 
view that price discounts are indeed a major cause for this but only in the case of non-
financial firms. We also document the importance of other firm-characteristics and market 
sentiment as determinants of post-announcement CARs for non-financial firms whereas for 
financial firms evidence was found for market sentiment and last year firm performance.  
 
Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that in spite of the negative signal to investors 
conveyed by a significant price discount in the new shares, managers of non-financial 
companies still engage in substantially price-cutting. Our analysis shows that this occurs 
particularly when managers feel that the risks and costs and of an issue failure are high 
enough to compensate for the adverse reaction from the market to such discounts. This is 
more likely when companies face an adverse market climate, when their debt levels are high 
and when in the presence of losses.    
  
 20 
 
References 
 
Altman, E., 1968, Financial Ratio, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp. 589-609 
Armitage, S., 1998, Seasoned Equity Offers and Rights Issues: A Review of the Evidence, 
European Journal of Finance, vol. 4, pp. 29-59  
Armitage, 2002, Do Underwriters Certify Value? Evidence From UK Rights Issues and Open 
Offers, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 29, Nrs. 9&10, pp. 1239-
1273 
Armitage, S., 2007, Discounts in Placing Pre-.Renounced Shares in Rights Issues, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 34, Nrs. 7&8, pp. 1345-1369 
Balanchadran, B., R. Faff, M. Theobald, E. Velayutham and P. Verwijmeren (2008), ‘The 
Choice of Seasoned Equity Offerings Methods and Long Term Returns’, Working 
Paper, EFA 2009 Bergen Meeting Paper 
Balanchadran, B., R. Faff and M. Theobald (2008), Rights Offerings, Takeup, 
Renounceability, and Underwriting Status, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89, 
No 2, pp. 328-346 
Balanchadran, B., R. Faff and M. Theobald (2009), New Insights Into Rights Offerings as 
Signals of Firm Quality: Evidence From Australia, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 21, No 3, pp. 80-85 
Beatty, R.., and J.. Ritter, 1986, Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of 
initial public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 213–232. 
Bohren, O, B. Eckbo and. Michalsen (1997), Why Underwrite Rights Offerings? Some New 
Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 46, No 2, pp. 223-261 
Brigham, E., 1986, Financial Management – Theory and Practice, 4th Edition, Holt-Saunders 
International Edition 
Burton, B. M., A. A. Lonie and D. M. Power (1999), Does the Issue Method Influence the 
Market Reaction to Seasoned Equity Offer Announcements?, Applied Economics 
Letters, Vol. 6, No.7, pp. 459–62. 
Capstaff , J. and J. Fletcher, John, 2011, Long Term Performance and Choice of SEO Method 
by UK Firms, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 38, Nr. 9‐10, pp. 
1262-1289  
Christie, A. , 1982, The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: Value, leverage and 
interest rate effects, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, Nr. 4, pp. 407-432. 
Copeland, T. and Galai, D., 1983, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 38, Nr. 5, pp.1457–1469 
Corwin, S. A., 2003, The Determinants of Underpricing for Seasoned Equity Offers,  Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 58, Nr. 5, pp. 2249–2279 
Dahl, D., and R. Shrieves, 1990, The impact of regulation on bank equity infusions. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, Vol. 14, Nr. 6, pp. 1209-1228. 
Eckbo, B. E. and R. W. Masulis (1995), Seasoned Equity Offerings: A Survey, in R. Jarrow, 
V. Maksimovic and W. T. Ziemba (eds.) Handbooks in Operation Research and 
Management, Science: Finance (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, North Holland), Vol. 
9, pp. 1017–72. 
Eckbo, R., and R. Masulis (1997), Adverse Selection and the Rights Offer Paradox, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, No 3, pp. 293-332 
Espenlaub, S., A. Iqbal and N. Strong, 2009, Datastream Returns And UK Open Offers, 
Eurpean Journal of Finance, Vol. 15. Nr.1, pp. 61-69 
Flanagan, M. (2009), Hefty Discount on Rights Issues, The Scotsman online, 24 September 
2009  
 21 
 
Gao, X., and J. Ritter, 2010,The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings.” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 97, pp. 33–52. 
Gerard, B., and V.  Nanda, 1993, Trading and manipulation around seasoned equity offerings, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 213–245. 
Ginglinger, E., L. Matsoukis and F. Riva, 2013, Seasoned Equity Offerings: Stock Market 
Liquidity and the Rights Offerings Paradox, Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 40, pp. 215-238 
Heinkel, L. and E. Schwartz (1986), Rights Versus Unverwritten Offerings: An Asymmetric 
Approach, Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, No 1, pp. 1-18 
Huang, R. and D. Zhang, 2011, Managing Underwriters and the Marketing of Seasoned 
Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 46, pp. 141-70. 
Iqbal, A. (2008), The Importance of the Sequence in UK Rights Issues, Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, Vol. 35, No. 1-B. 2, pp. 150-176. 
Kabir, R., and P. Roosenboom, 2003, Can the stock market anticipate future operating 
performance? Evidence from equity rights issues, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 
9, nr. 1, pp. 93-113 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Schleifer, 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, Issues 1–2, 2000, Pages 3–27 
Lee, I., S. Lochhead, J. Ritter, and Q. Zhao, 1996, The costs of raising capital, Journal of 
Financial Research, Vol. 19, pp. 59–74. 
Levis, M. (1995), Seasoned Equity Offerings and the and the short- and long-run 
performance of initial public offerings in the UK, European Financial Management, 
Vol. 1, Issue 2, pp. 125-146. 
Loderer, C., J. Cooney, and L. Van Drunen, 1991, The price elasticity of demand for 
common stock, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, pp. 621–651. 
Marsden, A. (2000), Shareholder wealth effects of rights issues:Evidence from the New 
Zealand capital market, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 419-442 
Marsh, P., 1980, Valuation of Underwriting Agreements for UK Rights Issues, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 35, nr. 3, pp. 693-716 
Maug, E., 1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and 
Control?, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, nr. 1, pp. 65-98 
Nevis, M., 1995, Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial 
public offerings in the UK, European Financial Management, Vol. 1, Nr. 2, pp. 125-
146 
Singh, A. (1997), Layoffs and Underwritten Rights Offers, Journal of Financial 
Economics,Vol. 43, No.1, pp. 105–30. 
Slovin, B. , M. Sushka and K. Lai (2000), Alternative Flotation Methods, Adverse Selection 
and Ownership Structure: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Issuance in the UK, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 57, Nr. 2, pp. 157-190 
Office of Fair Trading, 2011, Equity Underwriting and Associated Services, OFT1303 
Working Paper 
Rock, K., 1986, Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics  Vol.15, 
pp. 187–212 
Scholes, M., 1972, The market for securities: Substitution versus price pressure and the 
effects of information on share prices, Journal of Business, Vol. 45, pp. 179–211. 
 22 
 
Table 1: Variables Definition and expected relationship with price discount  
Variables Description Expected Sign 
Pre-announcement   
Price Discount Price Discount = 1 – (issue price divided by last price) Dependent 
Variable 
Leverage Leverage = Total debt divided by total assets (+) 
Bid_Ask Stock’s bid –ask spread in the 260 days prior to the right 
issue announcement 
(+) 
Loss Binary variable equal to one if return on assets is 
negative and zero otherwise 
(+) 
M_Sentiment Binary variable equal to one if last year market return 
(previous to announcement) is positive and zero 
otherwise 
(-) 
 
Table 2: Variables Definition and expected relationship with Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Variables Description Expected Sign 
Post-announcement   
CAR_Rights Cumulative abnormal returns around announcement of 
rights issues terms 
Dependent 
Variable 
Price Discount Price Discount = 1 – (issue price divided by last price) (-) 
Size Natural logarithm of firm’s market value (+) 
ROA Return on Assets = Net Income divided by lagged total 
assets 
(+) 
Tobin’s Q Market value of Equity plus Book value of Debt divided 
by book value of debt and  Equity 
(+) 
C_Held_Shares Closely held shares =  percentage shares held by 
majority shareholders 
(-)/(+) 
F_Sentiment Binary variable equal to one if firm’s cumulative return 
in prior 90 days to announcement is positive and zero 
otherwise 
(+) 
 
 23 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Non-Financials 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile Min Max 
Pre-announcement        
Price Discount 0.291 0.291 0.109 0.159 0.328 0.012 0.989 
Leverage 0.259 0.193 0.122 0.239 0.342 0.000 0.917 
Bid_ask 0.052 0.057 0.017 0.030 0.064 0.002 0.301 
Loss 0.388 0.488 0 0 1 0 1 
M_Sentiment 0.608 0.489 0 1 1 0 1 
        
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile Min Max 
Post-announcement        
CAR_Rights -0.028 0.106 -0.074 -0.016 0.035 -0.512 0.214 
Size 4.253 1.836 3.006 4.302 5.508 -0.073 9.134 
ROA -0.059 0.433 -0.110 0.034 0.096 -3.100 0.883 
Tobin’s Q 3.317 3.696 1.381 2.006 3.468 0.228 18.872 
C_Held_Shares 0.297 0.216 0.126 0.254 0.425 0.000 0.903 
F_Sentiment 0.599 0.491 0 1 1 0 1 
 
Panel B: Financials 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile Min Max 
Pre-announcement        
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Price Discount 0.245 0.276 0.061 0.125 0.305 0.012 0.921 
Leverage 0.326 0.289 0.017 0.387 0.520 0.000 0.917 
Bid_ask 0.036 0.030 0.013 0.029 0.052 0.002 0.116 
Loss 0.333 0.478 0 0 1 0 1 
M_Sentiment 0.694 0.467 0 1 1 0 1 
        
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
 Quartile Min Max 
Post-announcement        
CAR_Rights -0.036 0.127 -0.061 -0.012 0.016 -0.512 0.214 
Size 4.956 2.059 3.577 4.915 6.020 -0.073 9.134 
ROA -0.018 0.257 -0.010 0.009 0.031 -1.416 0.311 
Tobin’s Q 2.409 3.526 1.001 1.355 1.641 0.820 18.783 
C_Held_Shares 0.255 0.257 0.028 0.180 0.366 0.000 0.798 
F_Sentiment 0.639 0.487 0 1 1 0 1 
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Table 4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
The sample consists of 232 and 36 deals for non-financial and financial firms, respectively, over the period 1994-2012. Values for the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
matrixes are presented below and above the diagonal, respectively. P-values are in parenthesis. Superscript* indicate statistical significant at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 
(*). 
Panel A: Non-Financials 
 CAR_Rights Price Discount Size Tobin’s Q Leverage ROA C_Held_Shares Bid_Ask Loss M_Sentiment F_Sentiment 
CAR_Rights 1 -0.247*** 0.114 0.200** 0.0265 0.133* 0.082 -0.096 -0.126 0.210** 0.142* 
Price Discount -0.154* 1 -0.035 -0.129 0.167* -0.279*** -0.020 0.189** 0.285*** -0.088 -0.036 
Size 0.173** -0.153* 1 0.325*** -0.011 0.332*** -0.490*** -0.840*** -0.316*** 0.178** 0.0032 
Tobin’s Q 0.163* 0.039 0.121 1 -0.226*** 0.350*** -0.100 -0.300*** -0.230*** 0.237*** 0.068 
Leverage 0.006 0.221*** 0.003 -0.163* 1 -0.010 -0.023 -0.007 0.017 -0.090 -0.028 
ROA -0.001 -0.226*** 0.208** -0.059 -0.080 1 -0.090 -0.455*** -0.844*** 0.255*** -0.037 
C_Held_Shares -0.003 0.0857 -0.455*** 0.012 -0.011 -0.075 1 0.426*** 0.089 -0.016 0.053 
Bid_Ask -0.098 0.317*** -0.684*** -0.051 0.040 -0.278*** 0.302*** 1 0.450*** -0.138* 0.036 
Loss -0.145* 0.274*** -0.303*** 0.052 0.025 -0.499*** 0.106 0.382*** 1 -0.251*** 0.024 
M_Sentiment 0.221*** -0.071 0.185** 0.183** -0.078 0.123 -0.034 -0.055 -0.251*** 1 0.063 
F_Sentiment 0.123 0.052 -0.015 0.099 -0.030 -0.022 0.039 0.011 0.024 0.063 1 
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Panel B: Financials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CAR_Rights Price Discount Size Tobin’s Q Leverage ROA C_Held_Shares Bid_Ask Loss M_Sentiment F_Sentiment 
CAR_Rights 1 -0.282 0.127 0.351* -0.220 0.403* 0.212 -0.075 -0.420* 0.454** 0.363* 
Price Discount -0.198 1 -0.065 -0.316 -0.113 -0.513** -0.469** 0.126 0.596*** -0.111 -0.009 
Size 0.052 -0.283 1 0.179 -0.399* 0.296 -0.234 -0.894*** -0.323 0.248 -0.0377 
Tobin’s Q 0.174 -0.087 -0.176 1 -0.347* 0.132 0.320 -0.171 -0.119 0.053 -0.003 
Leverage -0.176 0.0813 -0.579*** -0.023 1 -0.067 0.185 0.384* 0.040 -0.059 0.142 
ROA 0.267 -0.169 0.174 -0.172 0.179 1 0.282 -0.267 -0.817*** 0.320 0.311 
C_Held_Shares 0.189 -0.329 -0.250 0.243 0.299 0.093 1 0.264 -0.261 0.156 0.247 
Bid_Ask -0.067 0.504** -0.863*** 0.121 0.528*** -0.124 0.101 1 0.363* -0.217 0.058 
Loss -0.188 0.693*** -0.318 0.243 0.046 -0.404* -0.256 0.437** 1 -0.450** -0.298 
M_Sentiment 0.450** -0.242 0.263 -0.083 -0.071 0.227 0.145 -0.239 -0.450** 1 0.380* 
F_Sentiment 0.358* -0.090 -0.077 -0.156 0.190 0.254 0.274 0.071 -0.298 0.380* 1 
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Table 5: Pre-announcement Multivariate Regression Results for Price Discount 
Table shows cross section analysis of price discounts. The following model is estimated:                                                         
                      by OLS. Estimation period is from 1994 to 2012. The dependent variable is price discount defined as one minus the issue price divided by the last 
available price. Reported t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculating using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White). Superscript * indicate statistical significance at 
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Financials Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Financials Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
          
 
          
Leverage 0.333*** 0.315*** 0.312*** 0.315*** 
 
Leverage 0.078 -0.245 -0.108 -0.118 
 
(2.931) (2.997) (2.988) (3.007) 
  
(0.389) (-1.641) (-0.898) (-0.935) 
Bid-Ask 
 
1.575*** 1.232*** 1.231*** 
 
Bid-Ask 
 
5.894*** 2.942** 2.796* 
  
(3.671) (2.712) (2.709) 
   
(3.603) (2.051) (2.029) 
Loss 
  
0.105** 0.104** 
 
Loss 
  
0.323*** 0.342*** 
   
(2.323) (2.319) 
    
(3.236) (3.860) 
M_Sentiment 
   
0.031 
 
M_Sentiment 
   
0.052 
    
(0.854) 
     
(0.627) 
Constant 0.205*** 0.128*** 0.106*** 0.087** 
 
Constant 0.220*** 0.111* 0.066 0.032 
 
(6.555) (4.046) (3.662) (2.310) 
  
(3.431) (1.869) (1.357) (0.411) 
           Observations 232 232 232 232 
 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.049 0.144 0.17 0.173 
 
R-squared 0.007 0.301 0.539 0.546 
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Table 6: Pre-announcement Ordered probit Results for Price Discount 
Panel A: Table shows ordered probit analyses of price discount. Price discount is divided in terciles. Estimation period is from 1994 to 2012. The dependent variable is price 
discount defined as one minus the issue price divided by the last available price. Reported t-statistics (in parenthesis).. Dependent variable is price discount defined as one 
minus the issue price divided by the last available price. Reported t-statistics (in parenthesis). Superscript * indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 
(*). 
 
Non-Financials Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Financials Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Leverage 
1.026*** 1.009** 1.006** 0.979** 
 
Leverage 
-0.845 -1.792** -1.526** -1.736** 
(2.597) (2.562) (2.496) (2.440) (-1.076) (-2.397) (-2.133) (-2.154) 
Bid-Ask  
3.269** 1.636 1.656 
 
Bid-Ask  
16.80** 6.907 3.701 
 
(2.000) (0.978) (0.981) 
 
(2.228) (0.838) (0.416) 
Loss   
0.497*** 0.502*** 
 
Loss   
1.336** 1.815*** 
  
(2.786) (2.802) 
  
(2.208) (2.843) 
M_Sentiment    
-0.211 
 
M_Sentiment    
0.982* 
   
(-1.392) 
   
(1.818) 
          
 
          
Cut 1 -0.168 -0.0124 0.0821 -0.0495 
 
Cut 1 -0.718** -0.472 -0.406 0.194 
(-1.314) (-0.0880) (0.577) (-0.298) (-2.192) (-1.295) (-1.124) (0.383) 
    
    
Cut 2 0.706*** 0.875*** 0.993*** 0.867*** 
 
Cut 2 0.167 0.496 0.700* 1.417*** 
(5.321) (5.905) (6.702) (5.102) (0.549) (1.410) (1.957) (2.915) 
    
    
Wald Chi2 6.744 11.31 21.23 22.24 
 
Wald Chi2 1.158 8.067 15.20 15.76 
Pseudo R-squared 0.014 0.025 0.043 0.047 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.020 0.078 0.172 0.221 
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Panel B: Shows the marginal effects for the ordered probit regressions. Predict outcome 0 to 2 represents the probability of price discount in each of the terciles due to 
change in variables, Leverage, Bid-Ask, Loss and M_Sentiment. Estimation period is from 1994 to 2012. Dependent variable is price discount defined as one minus the issue 
price divided by the last available price. Reported t-statistics (in parenthesis). Superscript * indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*). 
Non-Financials Predict Outcome (0) Predict Outcome (1) Predict Outcome (2) 
 
Financials Predict Outcome (0) Predict Outcome (1) Predict Outcome (2) 
Leverage -0.336** 0.004 0.332** 
 
Leverage 0.466** -0.021 -0.445** 
(2.51) (0.19) (2.48) (2.3) (0.37) (2.16) 
Bid_Ask -0.568 0.006 0.562 
 
Bid_Ask -0.993 0.044 0.948 
(0.99) (0.19) (0.98) (0.41) (0.26) (0.42) 
Loss -0.172*** 0.002 0.170*** 
 
Loss -0.487*** 0.022 0.465*** 
(2.9) (0.19) (2.89) (3.57) (0.36) (3.69) 
M_Sentiment 0.072 -0.001 -0.072 
 
M_Sentiment -0.263* 0.012 0.252* 
(1.4) (0.19) (1.41) (1.93) (0.38) (1.83) 
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Table 7: Post-announcement Multivariate Regression Results for CAR 
Panel A: Non-Financials 
Table shows cross section analysis of CAR. The following model is estimated:                                                                   
                                         by OLS. Estimation period is from 1994 to 2012. Dependent variable is Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). Reported t-
statistics (in parenthesis) are calculating using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White). Superscript * indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 
0.10 (*). 
 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Price Discount -0.056* -0.048* -0.051* -0.055* -0.055* -0.053* 
(-1.929) (-1.659) (-1.739) (-1.932) (-1.969) (-1.940) 
 
 
    
Size 
 
0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.011** 0.009** 
 
(2.422) (2.191) (2.267) (2.536) (2.191) 
 
 
 
   
Tobin’s Q 
  
0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 
  
(2.412) (2.310) (2.186) (1.721) 
  
 
 
  
ROA 
   
-0.014 -0.014 -0.018 
   
(-0.651) (-0.670) (-0.907) 
   
 
 
 
C_Held_Shares 
    
0.043 0.039 
    
(1.107) (1.015) 
    
 
 
F_Sentiment 
     
0.037*** 
     
(2.715) 
 
      
Constant -0.011 -0.052*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.084*** -0.097*** 
(-1.346) (-2.624) (-3.007) (-3.054) (-3.060) (-3.444) 
 
    
  
R-squared 0.024 0.047 0.069 0.072 0.078 0.106 
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Panel B: Financials 
 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Price Discount -0.091 -0.092 -0.081 -0.061 -0.044 -0.025 
(-1.390) (-1.460) (-1.205) (-0.892) (-0.462) (-0.275) 
      
Size  -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 (-0.034) (0.233) (0.021) (0.268) (-0.450) 
      
Tobin’s Q   0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 
  (0.880) (1.040) (1.051) (1.682) 
      
ROA    0.139*** 0.134*** 0.104*** 
   (4.620) (4.602) (3.396) 
      
C_Held_Shares     0.046 0.009 
    (0.474) (0.123) 
      
F_Sentiment      0.110* 
     (1.953) 
       
Constant -0.013 -0.012 -0.040 -0.038 -0.063 -0.100 
(-0.530) (-0.250) (-0.772) (-0.745) (-0.758) (-1.161) 
       
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.065 0.138 0.145 0.297 
 
 
 
